Analysis: Supreme Court strikes down some Trump priorities, but expands presidential power
Supreme Court struck down President Trump’s executive order limiting birthright citizenship and upheld state laws banning transgender athletes from competing on teams matching their self‑identified gender. The court also rejected Trump’s tariff policy while affirming the president’s firings of heads of independent federal agencies, except for the Federal Reserve, thereby expanding presidential power in federal agencies. Chief Justice John Roberts wrote that Trump’s order violated the 14th Amendment, confirming that the Constitution generally guarantees birthright citizenship. The term reinforced the court’s role as a functioning branch of government, with justices seen as independent rather than merely political actors.
3 months ago
The U.S. Supreme Court concluded its 2025‑2026 term with a mix of rulings that struck down key Trump‑era policies—most notably an executive order limiting birthright citizenship—while affirming state‑level transgender sports bans and expanding presidential authority over federal agencies. 1
The Court issued several high‑profile decisions, rejecting Trump’s broad tariff scheme and upholding the president’s removal of heads of independent agencies, except for the Federal Reserve. These actions collectively increased executive power within the federal bureaucracy. 1
Chief Justice John Roberts authored the majority opinion that the Trump executive order restricting birthright citizenship violated the 14th Amendment. The decision reaffirmed the longstanding constitutional understanding that children born in the United States are citizens, even when parents are unlawfully present. 1
Justice Brett Kavanaugh concurred in the judgment but based his reasoning on a statutory conflict rather than the constitutional provision, noting the order’s incompatibility with the federal statute governing citizenship. 1
Legal scholars highlighted the opinion’s textualist and originalist approach, describing it as a detailed effort to settle the issue definitively. 1
The Court upheld Idaho and West Virginia laws requiring student athletes to compete according to their biological sex, rejecting challenges based on gender‑identity claims. 1
In June, the Court allowed the Trump administration to reinstate “metering” at the U.S.–Mexico border, permitting the turning away of asylum seekers before they enter the country. It also cleared the way for ending Temporary Protected Status (TPS) for Haitian and Syrian nationals residing in the United States. 1
The Court granted relief in three capital‑punishment cases involving intellectual disability or alleged racial bias, signaling a protective stance toward defendants in death‑penalty proceedings. Catholic advocacy groups noted a broader national trend away from the death penalty, despite occasional state‑level increases in executions. 1
Analysts described the term as confirming the Court’s functional role in government while expanding presidential authority over agencies. The birthright citizenship decision leaves room for congressional action or constitutional amendment, and the Court’s upcoming 2026‑2027 term is expected to continue shaping these contentious policy areas. 1*
Assess how U.S. courts interpret the 14th Amendment
U.S. courts—especially the U.S. Supreme Court—have interpreted the Fourteenth Amendment in ways that (in the Catholic critique found in these sources) exclude the unborn from constitutional “person” protections and, through “privacy”/substantive due process reasoning, prioritize a woman’s decision about abortion over the unborn child’s right to life.
In the abortion-related cases addressed by these Catholic sources, courts are described as treating the Fourteenth Amendment’s use of “person” as applying primarily (or effectively only) to postnatal individuals, not to unborn human beings.
Assessment (from these sources’ standpoint): the practical effect of this interpretation is that courts do not recognize the unborn as constitutional “persons” entitled to Fourteenth-Amendment protection in the same way as persons after birth.
These sources also highlight a second, court-centered move: reading constitutional protection for certain intimate decisions through “privacy,” often associated with the liberty protections of the Fourteenth Amendment’s due process structure (and connected to earlier “zone of privacy” reasoning described in Griswold).
Assessment (from these sources’ standpoint): U.S. courts interpret the Fourteenth Amendment’s liberty protection in a way that supports a constitutional “privacy” interest strong enough to protect abortion access, resulting in a perceived hierarchy where privacy/liberty outweighs unborn life protection.
A further theme in these sources is the Court’s choice to set limits on what it will decide and which kinds of disputes it will treat as constitutionally decisive.
Assessment (from these sources’ standpoint): courts in this area are presented as adopting interpretive boundaries (e.g., reluctance to resolve contested “personhood” questions in the way one side argues) and as using historical-linguistic meaning of “person” to conclude unborn persons are not covered.
These sources also evaluate the Court’s interpretation using Catholic moral and theological premises—especially the idea that human life has inherent dignity from conception to death, and therefore cannot be morally diminished by judicial interpretation.
Assessment (from these sources’ standpoint): the bishops regard the Court’s Fourteenth-Amendment interpretations (about personhood and privacy priority in abortion) not merely as a different constitutional view, but as an interpretation that clashes with the Church’s understanding of the right to life and the objective dignity of the human person.
The provided Catholic references focus heavily on abortion-related Fourteenth Amendment interpretation (personhood and privacy/liberty). They do not, in the materials given here, systematically survey how courts interpret the Fourteenth Amendment’s Equal Protection Clause or other doctrines across many fields (race, voting, criminal procedure, immigration, etc.).
From the perspective of these Catholic sources, U.S. courts interpret the Fourteenth Amendment—particularly the meaning of “person” and the liberty/privacy implications of its due process structure—in a way that does not recognize the unborn as Fourteenth-Amendment “persons” and instead treats abortion access as protected by constitutional privacy/liberty, leading to an outcome the bishops and authors judge morally unjust.