British archbishop decries new bill banning ‘conversion practices’
Archbishop John Sherrington of Liverpool voiced serious concern that the UK’s draft bill banning conversion practices is overly broad. He warned the proposed definition of abusive practices could threaten religious freedom and expression, create uncertainty about church pastoral care, and expose parents to legal action for well-intentioned conversations. Sherrington said the Church opposes abuse but argued existing laws already prohibit abusive practices, and urged politicians to abandon the bill and enforce current protections. Labour MP Mary Glindon also warned that the bill could make it harder for parents to discuss or support children questioning their sexual orientation or gender identity.
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Archbishop John Sherrington has urged UK politicians to abandon a draft bill banning “conversion practices,” arguing that its broad definitions could put religious freedom, pastoral care and ordinary family conversations at risk. He says the Catholic Church opposes abuse but believes existing law already addresses it.
The bill is undergoing pre-legislative scrutiny. It defines a conversion practice as conduct intended to change, or influence someone’s belief about, their sexual orientation or transgender identity; conduct could be defined as abusive if it causes serious physical or mental harm, or serious alarm or distress that substantially affects daily life.
Sherrington, who chairs the Department for Social Justice for the Catholic bishops’ conference of England and Wales, said the bill’s scope could threaten freedom of religion or belief and freedom of expression. He warned it could create uncertainty for church pastoral care and open conversations, and could expose parents or organisations to legal action for well-intentioned statements.
He said people of faith should remain free to express their beliefs through speech and prayer, while the Church continues to oppose abuse in all circumstances. Sherrington called on politicians to focus on enforcing existing protections and providing accessible support to people facing abuse or coercion, rather than proceeding with the bill.
Labour MP Mary Glindon also argued that the bill could make it harder for people to seek help. She said parental advice is not abusive simply because a child objects to it, and maintained that parents should be able to discuss a child’s feelings and express concerns about sexual orientation or gender identity.
Glindon said protecting LGBT people from abuse and safeguarding parents, churches and professionals who provide genuine support should be pursued together.
Religious freedom and pastoral care amid protections against abuse
The concern is a real one of principle: the state has a duty to protect people—especially minors and other vulnerable persons—from abuse, coercion, and manipulation, while religious communities and individuals must remain free to teach, seek counsel, and practise their faith without undue state control. Catholic teaching supports both duties. It does not permit religious freedom to be used as a shield for abuse, nor does safeguarding justify treating ordinary, non-coercive pastoral care as abuse simply because it involves religious convictions. The material available here does not include the draft bill’s text or its proposed definitions, so it is not possible to determine whether the specific concern about overbreadth is borne out.
Religious freedom is not immunity from laws that protect people from harm. The International Theological Commission says that political authority must defend citizens, “especially the weakest,” against religious practices involving psychological or emotional manipulation, exploitation, or isolation. It also places that responsibility alongside respect for religious rights and freedom of conversion. This is an important Catholic qualification: religious claims and pastoral authority remain subject to moral accountability, and the state has a legitimate role in protecting the vulnerable.
The Church’s own safeguarding standards make the priority concrete. In pastoral activities involving minors, protection is to come first: workers are instructed to act prudently, remain visible to others, respect privacy, report potentially dangerous conduct, and keep parents or guardians informed. The guidelines also forbid conduct such as creating a secretive or preferential relationship with a minor, placing a child in a potentially dangerous situation, or engaging in sexually suggestive behaviour. These safeguards show that protecting children is not external to pastoral care; it is one of its obligations.
That priority must also shape how cases of abuse are handled. A theological study in the supplied material argues that abuse should not be ignored or minimized in the name of mercy, and that ecclesial authorities should care for victims and cooperate with civil justice. It says that where the interests of an abuser and a victim conflict, the victim’s vulnerability must take precedence. This is scholarly analysis rather than a binding Church document, but it expresses a clear moral implication: defending religious liberty cannot mean obstructing justice or shielding perpetrators.
At the same time, safeguarding law must be framed and applied in a way that respects conscience and religion. Pope Leo XIV describes freedom of thought, conscience, and religion as a fundamental right protecting a person’s “most intimate sphere.” He adds that a society should recognize and legally protect religious life, and that faith should not require a person to forfeit a contribution to public life. The point is not that religious bodies are exempt from generally applicable protections, but that public power should not needlessly intrude into religious belief, worship, or the Church’s internal life.
The Church’s religious freedom is not merely the private freedom of individual believers. The scholarly discussion of Dignitatis Humanae in the supplied material emphasizes that religious communities need room to organize themselves according to their principles, provided they do not harm public order. It also describes the freedom of the Church as including public institutions and activities, not just private belief. Applied to pastoral care, this means that the state should distinguish between coercion or abuse—which may properly be restricted—and religious teaching or spiritual counsel that is freely sought and offered without abusive conduct.
A sound assessment of any proposed ban therefore depends on what it prohibits and how it defines harm. If a law targets coercion, threats, exploitation, or abusive treatment, it can serve the common good and protect vulnerable people. But if its wording or enforcement sweeps in ordinary religious teaching, prayer, or voluntary pastoral conversations simply because they concern a person’s beliefs or choices, it may interfere with freedom of conscience and religion. That risk is especially relevant to a law described as banning “conversion practices,” because the term’s legal definition determines whether the law addresses abusive conduct or reaches more broadly. The supplied material does not establish what the draft bill actually includes, so the specific boundary cannot be assessed here.
The International Theological Commission’s framework helps avoid both errors. It says religious expression must be assessed in light of the common good, while also recognizing peaceful reciprocity of religious rights and freedom of conversion. Thus, neither “it is religious, so it must be permitted” nor “it concerns a sensitive personal matter, so religious counsel must be prohibited” is an adequate Catholic principle. The relevant questions include whether the person is free to participate or withdraw, whether there is manipulation or exploitation, and whether the law protects people from concrete harm without controlling legitimate religious practice.
The concern attributed to Archbishop John Sherrington—that a proposed definition of abusive practices may be too broad—should be treated as a question requiring close attention to the bill’s exact language, not as proof that the law is either necessary in every respect or hostile to religion. The Catholic framework supports robust protection for people at risk and careful scrutiny of any measure that could unjustly restrict conscience, religious teaching, or pastoral ministry. Pope Leo’s recent address likewise stresses that public authorities should protect the space in which convictions and conscience mature, while recognizing that freedom entails responsible commitment to the good.
In short, safeguarding and religious liberty are not competing absolutes. Effective protection should confront abuse and manipulation directly; respect for religious freedom should prevent that purpose from being extended into unjust control of non-coercive religious counsel. Whether the draft bill achieves that balance remains unresolved without its text and details about how it would be applied.