Fewer Nuns, Fewer Children: The Striking Study That Highlights the Demographic Impact of the Shortage of Consecrated Women
A 2018 economic study examines whether the decline of religious women in Europe contributed to falling fertility among Catholics. Researchers suggest that as congregations contracted, families lost access to schools, health care, and other support services once provided by religious institutions. The loss of those services may have raised the effective cost of raising children; the argument concerns practical support, not simply the effect of religious belief on birth rates.
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The article describes research suggesting that the decline of religious sisters may have contributed to lower fertility in Europe by reducing access to relatively affordable services such as education, healthcare and elder care. It presents this as one possible factor among many—not as a sole or proven principal cause—and uses Spain to illustrate how the Church’s social-service network has contracted.
A 2018 study by economists Eli Berman, Laurence R. Iannaccone and Giuseppe Ragusa examined 13 European countries from 1960 to 2000, a period when both religious practice and fertility fell. Rather than treating religious belief itself as the measure, the researchers used the number of women religious per 10,000 Catholics as an indicator of the Church’s institutional presence, given sisters’ roles in schools, hospitals and welfare services.
The study’s statistical models estimated effects on the order of 300 to 400 children per nun, indicating a potentially significant association between the presence of religious communities and fertility. The figures show marked declines in several countries: between 1960 and 2000, sisters per 10,000 Catholics fell from 21 to 15 in Spain, 31 to 20 in Italy, 30 to 10 in France, and 77 to 18 in the Netherlands; Portugal remained at seven.
The article stresses that the study does not establish that the loss of sisters caused Europe’s fertility decline, much less that it was the only or main cause. Its proposed link is practical: when services once provided by religious congregations disappear or are replaced at higher cost, the effective cost and burden of raising children may rise.
A separate European study published in July 2026, which did not examine religious institutions, found an association between access to public childcare and the likelihood of having children, particularly among lower-income women. The article presents this as related evidence about how the availability of support services can figure in family decisions.
Spain’s number of professed religious sisters fell from about 88,000 in 1969 to around 58,000 in 1987 and 32,996 in 2024, according to figures cited in the article. Ageing communities and fewer new vocations have led congregations to close houses, leave institutions or transfer their management.
The article gives two examples: the Little Sisters of the Poor closed a Bilbao care home in 2024 after nearly four decades because too few sisters remained to operate it; in January 2025, the Sisters of the Abandoned left an institution in Caravaca de la Cruz that they had managed since 1883, and a private company took over its administration.
Catholic education has also shifted. The number of Catholic educational institutions in Spain declined from about 2,635 in the 2010–11 academic year to 2,536 in 2023–24, while publicly funded Catholic schools fell from approximately 2,445 to 2,402. Laypeople now make up 97% of teachers in Catholic schools, compared with 3% who are religious personnel.
Replacing religious personnel with lay professionals brings conventional employment costs, including wages and social-security contributions. Whether those costs reach families depends on each institution’s funding and on how much is covered by public authorities or the institutions themselves.
The Church’s figures cited in the article show that the number of people benefiting from its social and charitable activities in Spain fell from 4.7 million in 2017 to just over 3.8 million in 2024, a decline of about 20%. The article says this indicates a reduced reach for a network that has complemented public welfare provision, while noting that the decline does not mean every service has disappeared.
The article’s central point is that fertility is shaped not only by individual preferences, cultural attitudes or household income, but also by the practical services available to families. When those services become less accessible, more expensive or differently managed, households may carry a greater share of the work and cost of care.
Consecrated women’s institutions shape Catholic family life and fertility
Consecrated women’s institutions can shape Catholic family life in meaningful pastoral and cultural ways: through education, care for children and the sick, support for couples, and the witness of a life devoted to God. Catholic teaching also connects that service to “responsible parenthood.” But the supplied material does not establish that these institutions measurably raise or lower fertility rates. It supports a theological and pastoral account of influence, not a demographic finding.
In Familiaris Consortio, John Paul II presents consecrated life itself as the starting point for this service. By embracing chastity for the Kingdom of God, religious women bear witness to the Church’s relationship with Christ and become available for works of charity and apostolate. The exhortation names practical forms of family ministry: caring for children—especially those who are abandoned, poor, orphaned, or disabled—visiting families, helping the sick, supporting families in difficulty, preparing young people for marriage, and assisting couples in responsible parenthood. It also urges religious institutes to treat the family apostolate as a priority while remaining faithful to each institute’s distinctive charism.
“They can also visit families and look after the sick; they can foster relationships of respect and charity towards one-parent families or families that are in difficulties or are separated; they can offer their own work of teaching and counseling in the preparation of young people for marriage, and in helping couples towards truly responsible parenthood.”
This suggests several routes by which religious communities may affect family life: direct care, education, counsel, hospitality, and the example of communal prayer and charity. The text describes these as possibilities and responsibilities, not as proof that every institute carries them out or that they produce a particular social outcome.
The influence is not only from religious communities toward families. John Paul II describes the Christian family as the ordinary source of vocations to religious life, while religious life can help families grow in Christian faith, educate children, care for the sick, and face life’s problems. The relationship is therefore reciprocal: family life may foster vocations, and consecrated women may serve and strengthen families.
That reciprocity helps avoid a misleading contrast between women who marry and have children and women who enter religious life. Catholic teaching treats consecrated celibacy not as a condemnation of marriage or motherhood, but as a distinct vocation and sign of dedication to God. John Paul II describes religious consecration as pointing toward the Church’s union with Christ and as enabling service to others. Pope Francis likewise speaks of a maternal dimension in consecrated women’s love, expressed concretely in acts of care.
The term fertility needs care. It may refer to the number of children born, but Catholic reflection can also use it more broadly for the capacity of love and service to bear fruit. The supplied texts support the broader sense clearly: religious women have cared for children without parents, educated the young, served the sick, and undertaken charitable works. Pius XII describes consecrated persons as providing care and, where possible, something of a mother’s love to children and others in need.
The materials also explicitly connect religious women with couples’ discernment about “truly responsible parenthood.” But they do not define that term in detail here, nor do they show whether the counseling leads couples to have more children, fewer children, or the same number. It would therefore be unwarranted to treat the phrase as evidence for a specific fertility policy or demographic effect.
The institutional dimension matters because religious life is lived within communities and approved institutes, with formation shaped by each institute’s charism and fidelity to Church teaching. John Paul II also calls for strong formation for consecrated women and points to their contribution in areas including family and social life, the dignity of women, and respect for human life. Historically, religious women’s roles have included teaching, nursing, and caring for orphans and abandoned children.
Taken together, these sources support the claim that women’s religious institutions can influence the conditions in which Catholic families form and live: they can educate, advise, provide care, and embody a communal religious witness. They do not provide demographic data about births, fertility rates, or comparisons between places with more or fewer religious institutions. So the headline is credible as a claim about pastoral and cultural influence, but unresolved if it means that these institutions demonstrably change population-level fertility.