More Americans aware of ‘Christian nationalism,’ but negative view of it prevails
Pew Research Center reports that awareness of the term "Christian nationalism" has risen among Americans. Despite greater familiarity, most respondents view Christian nationalism negatively rather than positively. The study was released on May 14, 2026, highlighting a shift in public perception.
5 months ago
More Americans are now familiar with the term “Christian nationalism,” yet a majority still view it unfavorably. A Pew Research Center survey conducted in early April 2026 shows that 59 % of U.S. adults have heard of the concept, up 14 percentage points from two years earlier, while 31 % hold an unfavorable opinion and only 10 % express approval. White evangelical Protestants are the most likely to view it positively, whereas Catholics and many other groups remain skeptical or opposed. The poll also reveals sharp partisan splits, with Republicans more inclined to see religion as a positive force in public life and to support a stronger role for Christianity in government.
Investigate Catholic teachings on nationalism and civic identity
Catholic teaching does not treat “nation” and “citizenship” as disposable, nor does it baptize every form of modern nationalism. It offers a morally evaluative framework: human dignity and the common good are the measure; patriotism and love of one’s culture can be legitimate; while nationalism that turns into contempt, hatred, or “exclusive” claims of moral superiority is condemned.
Catholic social teaching begins with the common good—“the sum total of social conditions” that allow persons (as individuals and groups) to reach fulfillment more fully and more easily (Catechism, no. 1906, quoted in a bishops’ document).
This matters for nationalism/civic identity because the Church’s political judgment is not ultimately grounded in ethnicity, geography, or bloodline, but in whether social arrangements genuinely serve human flourishing. The “common good” includes respect for the dignity of the human person and the protection of rights that belong to each person “prior to society itself.”
The bishops’ presentation of Catholic moral reasoning highlights that charity must animate public life, and that faith teaches respect for the dignity of every person—especially the weak, vulnerable, and voiceless.
This is also why Catholic teaching treats certain moral limits as non-negotiable in public policy contexts: when political activity confronts moral principles “that do not admit of exception, compromise, or derogation,” Christians must recognize “the essence of the moral law.”
A Thomistic account presented in the provided material emphasizes that political leaders serve the community by providing and protecting the common good and establishing justice through laws and penalties that protect the community and help inculcate virtues.
So civic identity, in a Catholic lens, is not merely “belonging” to a nation—it includes a moral responsibility to build just social conditions.
A pastoral framework developed for the Church’s engagement with culture observes that human beings share a common nature (making one human family), but the historical condition of human life includes “a more intense sense of attachment to particular groups, from their family to their people or nation.”
This is presented as an anthropological foundation for “national rights,” described as human rights “considered at this specific level of the life of a community.”
The same framework states that a nation’s right to exist “naturally implies” that each nation has a right to its own language and culture—through which a people “expresses and defends its cultural sovereignty.”
This directly addresses civic identity: a healthy civic identity can allow cultural distinctiveness without treating it as an excuse for injustice toward others.
The provided material draws a clear distinction: while nationalism can involve contempt or hatred for other nations or cultures, patriotism is described as “an appropriate particular—but not exclusive—love of and service to one’s country and people.”
That “particular love” must be compatible with universal obligations: “the primary duty is undoubtedly to live in a spirit of peace, respect and solidarity with others.”
John Paul II’s remarks at a beatification homily explicitly call the model “true patriotism”: caring for the Slovenian language, social reforms, and national culture, while not yielding to “short-sighted nationalism” or selfish opposition to the aspirations of neighboring peoples.
John Paul II also ties this to coexistence: it is possible to be “sincere patriots” while cooperating with people of other nationalities, cultures, and religions.
Pius XI warns against an “excessive love of self and of one’s own,” described as an “undue exaltation” of feelings toward one’s people; when this encroaches on ties between peoples, “there is hardly anything so abnormal that it will not be regarded as free from fault.”
He describes a key mechanism: the “Divine law of brotherly love” binding nations “into one family under one Father” is replaced by a “hatred” that is said to be “fatal to all.”
John Paul II makes the distinction sharply at the United Nations: unhealthy nationalism teaches “contempt for other nations or cultures,” while patriotism is a proper love of one’s country.
He states a decisive criterion: true patriotism “never seeks to advance the well-being of one’s own nation at the expense of others,” because wrongdoing damages both aggressor and victim.
Paul VI identifies “nationalism and racism” as obstacles to creating a more just social order and to development of world solidarity.
While he grants it is “natural” for newly independent nations to protect fragile unity, he insists this “commendable attitude should be further ennobled by love, a love for the whole family of man.”
The harmful form is “haughty pride in one’s own nation” which “disunites nations and poses obstacles to their true welfare.”
Pius XI uses an even stronger formulation: patriotism kept “within the bounds of the law of Christ” is virtuous, but it “becomes merely an occasion, an added incentive to grave injustice” when true love of country is “debased” into “an extreme nationalism.”
In that state, the teaching says people forget that all men are brothers and members of one human family and that other nations have equal rights to life and prosperity, making it “never lawful nor even wise” to separate morality from practical affairs.
In Pope Leo XIV’s remarks about Lebanon, he states that peace grows in concrete living contexts (including historical and spiritual bonds), and he encourages fostering those bonds “without giving in to sectionalism or nationalism.”
A scholarly presentation of Benedict XV’s teaching (and its context) highlights that nineteenth-century nationalism involved defining oneself “in antagonism” to other peoples, not merely by reference to them.
In that context, the Church’s peace-oriented stance culminates in the idea that states should unite in “a single league… a sort of family of peoples,” intended to maintain independence while safeguarding the order of human society.
A central point in the political-theological discussion provided is that Catholics work for the common good of the societies in which they live—even when they are hated—and that the society includes many non-Catholics who must be cared for as well as one’s own community.
The same account emphasizes that Catholic “reasons” for political decisions are “distinctively Catholic,” because the common good is rooted in the conviction that humans are creatures of the triune God whose good lies in intimacy with God.
But this does not negate civic responsibility in pluralism: Catholics can fully agree with others of goodwill on political goods—such as religious freedom or ending abortion—though the deeper reasons may differ.
The provided discussion states that different political arrangements can be morally legitimate if they serve the common good, and that Vatican II’s Dignitatis Humanae “tilt[s] toward” freedom of conscience and freedom from coercion in religion, meaning a just society should not use its power to impose religious conviction.
A Thomistic-inflected account stresses that within the common good, citizens have “a significant role” in determining political construction (leaders, polity, laws), while also entrusting leaders to fulfill their duties faithfully.
This is a constructive model for civic identity: identity is not merely passive membership; it includes morally serious participation.
The bishops’ teaching emphasizes that charity must reach beyond small groups into “macro-relationships” (social, economic, and political ones).
It also frames social problems in terms of both personal and structural sin—“structures of sin” rooted in personal sin—so civic renewal must address personal conversion and institutional distortions together.
From the sources, a consistent Catholic criterion emerges:
Catholic teaching can support national language/culture as part of “national rights,” while still rejecting any slide into contempt, hatred, or treating other nations as inferior or disposable.
Because Catholic faith insists that moral principles without exception govern certain public matters (e.g., abortion and euthanasia, as cited in the bishops’ document), civic identity cannot be reduced to party loyalty or national momentum.
Catholic teaching treats civic identity as morally ordered to the common good, grounded in human dignity and implemented through responsible participation in public life. It distinguishes patriotism (love and service of one’s country in peace and solidarity) from nationalism when nationalism becomes excessive, antagonistic, contemptuous, or hatred-driven—an obstacle to solidarity and development.