Oregon withdraws disciplinary actions against Catholic counselor
Oregon's Board of Licensed Professional Counselors and Therapists has withdrawn its disciplinary order against Catholic counselor Frank Canepa after citing the Supreme Court's decision in Chiles v. Salazar. Canepa had been fined nearly $90,000 for refusing to affirm a client’s same‑sex relationship due to his Catholic faith, a penalty the board now reconsidering. The withdrawal follows an appeal by Alliance Defending Freedom, which argued that the punishment violated Canepa’s First Amendment rights. The Supreme Court ruling held that states cannot silence counselors’ personal viewpoints in therapy, influencing Oregon’s decision to reverse the sanctions.
3 months ago
The Oregon Board of Licensed Professional Counselors and Therapists has withdrawn a disciplinary order against Frank Canepa, a Catholic counselor who was fined for refusing to affirm a client’s same‑sex relationship, citing the U.S. Supreme Court’s 2026 decision in Chiles v. Salazar that bars states from silencing therapists’ viewpoints. 1 2
Frank Canepa, a licensed counselor in Beaverton, Oregon, told a long‑time client that he could not personally “bless” her same‑sex relationship because of his Catholic faith. The client pressed the issue for about 20 minutes in a single session, despite having seen Canepa 44 times over two and a half years without prior discussion of his religious views. 1
The Oregon board concluded that Canepa violated state law and the American Counseling Association’s Code of Ethics, imposing nearly $90,000 in fines, a requirement to attend six hours of continuing education, and the cost of his own hearing. 1
In March 2026, the U.S. Supreme Court issued an 8‑1 opinion in Chiles v. Salazar, holding that Colorado’s law targeting counselors’ viewpoints on sexual orientation and gender identity constituted unconstitutional viewpoint discrimination. The Court ruled that states cannot silence counselors’ personal or professional perspectives during therapy. 1 2
Following an appeal filed by Alliance Defending Freedom (ADF) on May 1, which argued that the sanctions infringed on Canepa’s First Amendment free‑speech and free‑exercise rights, the Oregon board voluntarily withdrew the disciplinary order on June 5. The board’s notice explicitly referenced the Chiles decision as the basis for its reversal. 1 2
ADF senior counsel Jonathan Scruggs said the Supreme Court’s ruling “takes Colorado to task for censoring counselors” and urged Oregon to respect counselors’ core convictions. He emphasized ADF’s commitment to protecting free speech for counselors nationwide. 1 2
With the disciplinary order withdrawn, Canepa is no longer required to pay the $89,636 fine or complete the mandated continuing‑education hours. The board indicated it will reconsider the case, but no further public explanation has been provided. 1
The withdrawal underscores how the Chiles decision is influencing state licensing boards, signaling that disciplinary actions based on counselors’ expressed religious beliefs may be subject to constitutional challenge. It also highlights ongoing legal battles over the balance between professional ethical standards and First Amendment protections for religious practitioners. 1 2
Examining Catholic counselors’ First Amendment rights in professional licensing
Catholic teaching grounds “First Amendment–type” claims for religious liberty and conscience protection in a deeper moral logic: civil authority must not coerce persons in religious matters, and persons must not cooperate—even indirectly—with objectively immoral actions. From that standpoint, the key question for Catholic counselors under professional licensing is not “Are rules ever valid?” but whether licensing conditions unjustly require cooperation with the moral wrongs Catholics are bound to refuse, and whether the state can achieve its legitimate regulatory aims without violating conscience and religious freedom.
Catholic moral teaching treats conscience not as a private preference, but as a site of moral responsibility before God. When civil directives conflict with the demands of the moral order, citizens are obliged not to follow them in conscience—“We must obey God rather than men” (Acts 5:29).
At the same time, the Church distinguishes between (a) refusing to cooperate with evil and (b) using “conscience” as a mere end-run around truth and duty. A conscientious objection, properly understood, is an appeal to truth, not an administrative “escape.”
A closely related point is stated in Catholic social doctrine: citizens are not obligated in conscience to follow civil prescriptions if those precepts are contrary to the moral order, fundamental rights, or the Gospel. In such cases, refusal is not only a moral duty but “also a basic human right which… civil law itself is obliged to recognize and protect.”
For professional licensing, the Catholic framework implies:
Catholic support for religious liberty in pluralistic societies is not based on the state endorsing Catholic truth claims. Rather, it is based on the juridical right to immunity from coercion in religious matters.
John Courtney Murray’s “articles of peace” distinction (as presented in Schindler’s treatment of Murray’s reading of Vatican II) captures the Catholic orientation toward the constitutional order: the First Amendment is treated not as a body of sectarian religious doctrine, but as law that does not answer “eternal human questions” about truth and freedom. In that view, Catholics can support the constitutional structure because it is not (properly interpreted) an imposed ideology; it is a framework that leaves religious truth to the moral authority of conscience and God.
Schindler further emphasizes Murray’s point that, juridically, religious freedom is fundamentally negative: it protects against coercion, not against the moral order.
In licensing contexts, this suggests a Catholic principle for church-state relations:
The state may set professional requirements, but it should not become a mechanism that coerces religious or moral commitments by forcing counselors to act in ways that violate conscience.
This does not mean counselors get an unlimited exemption from all rules. It means that the state’s regulatory aims must be pursued in a way compatible with immunity from coercion where conscience is at stake.
Even when a case concerns counseling rather than medicine, Catholic teaching insists that professionals can face situations where carrying out their duties would mean cooperating with evil. The Pontifical Academy for Life describes the “acid test” in health-care professions: Christians may need “courageous conscientious objection” when legislative norms provide actions that threaten life.
The same moral architecture applies more broadly: the Church holds that “it is a grave duty of conscience not to cooperate, not even formally,” in morally evil acts, even if civil legislation permits them; such cooperation cannot be justified by appeal to respect for others’ freedom or by the fact that civil law allows the practice.
The Church’s approach to pregnancy counseling provides a concrete pastoral signal. In a letter to German bishops, Pope John Paul II thanks them for “defend[ing] the life of unborn children” and mentions “ready[ing] to modify Catholic counseling activity,” accompanied by a blessing for those involved in counseling.
That combination—(1) commitment to defend life and (2) readiness to modify counseling activity—matters for licensing disputes. It suggests Catholics are not arguing for professional immunity from all regulation; they are typically arguing for structured accommodation (how the service is delivered, what is refused, what is referred, what can be honestly taught) so that counselors remain faithful while staying within lawful professional boundaries.
A Catholic counselor’s First Amendment–type defense would usually align with:
Catholic social teaching treats law as ordered toward the common good. When civil laws select what is needed to regulate civic life, they aim at enabling peaceful freedom for everyone.
This matters because a licensing board can argue it has compelling regulatory interests: protecting clients, ensuring competent practice, preventing harm, and maintaining public accountability. Catholic teaching does not deny that authority; it insists that the state must protect conscience and fundamental rights when laws demand moral cooperation with wrongdoing.
From a Catholic perspective, accommodation is not simply political strategy; it reflects the moral truth that rights of conscience must be recognized and protected. Catholic teaching explicitly says those invoking conscientious objection must be protected not only from penalties but also from negative “legal, disciplinary, financial and professional” effects.
So a licensing regime that treats conscience-based refusal as disqualifying punishment—rather than as a rights-protected boundary within professional life—would be hard to reconcile with this doctrine of conscience protection.
Without giving legal advice, Catholic teaching provides moral criteria to examine whether a particular licensing condition is likely to be compatible with religious freedom:
These are consonant with the principle that civil authority can promulgate laws aimed at enabling common civic life.
A rule becomes problematic in the Catholic framework if it:
Catholic teaching also warns against treating conscientious objection as a bluff. A conscientious objection should be grounded in truth and an earnest readiness to explain reasons—not a tactic for avoiding moral reasoning or professional obligations.
That helps define how a Catholic counselor would properly present conscience-based refusal in a licensing dispute: as a morally serious response, not as arbitrary exception-taking.
Catholic teaching approaches Catholic counselors’ First Amendment concerns in licensing not as a demand to escape every regulation, but as a defense of immunity from coercion in religious and moral matters and a refusal to cooperate with evil. Religious freedom is framed as protection against coercion, and conscientious objection is presented as both a moral duty and a basic human right that civil law must recognize—particularly where civil directives would otherwise produce professional penalties tied to refusing morally illicit cooperation.