Pope Leo urges Peruvian youth to reject lie that sin brings happiness
Pope Leo XIV urged nearly 60,000 young people at a Lima prayer vigil not to fear that following God means giving up their dreams or personal fulfillment. He warned against the belief that sin is necessary for happiness, recalling Benedict XVI’s words that “evil is always poisonous.”. Local authorities said another 300,000 young people followed the vigil from areas surrounding Peru’s National Stadium. Young Peruvians and volunteers celebrated the pope’s return to a country where he had served as a missionary.
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Pope Leo XIV urged nearly 60,000 young people at a prayer vigil in Lima to reject the idea that sin is necessary for happiness, saying faith need not mean giving up personal fulfillment. Drawing on testimonies of grief, loneliness and renewed faith, he encouraged young people to seek support, discern their vocations and share Christ’s friendship with others.
Speaking at Peru’s National Stadium on Nov. 12, Pope Leo warned that fear of losing out by following God could lead to the “dangerous suspicion” that people must experience sin to enjoy life fully. He urged the young people to remember Benedict XVI’s words that “evil is always poisonous.”
The vigil drew tens of thousands inside the stadium, while local authorities said another 300,000 people followed from nearby areas. The event’s motto, “And the Word became young and dwelt among us,” was presented by Lima’s Cardinal Carlos Gustavo Castillo as a call for young people to witness to Christ through their lives.
Before the pope spoke, three Peruvians described experiences of isolation, bereavement and depression. Medical student Joao Meza said parish life helped him find community and use his interest in dance to share part of himself with others.
Emily Herrera Marcos recounted returning to youth ministry after drifting from her parish, then facing multiple family deaths and the loss of a close friend. She said her faith helped her recognize that Christ’s presence can come through someone who listens and stays alongside a person in pain.
Sister Luzbinda Ramos Zurita told the gathering that she experienced depression after her mother’s sudden death. An encounter with Ursuline sisters led her to religious life; she now works in family catechesis and told young people that God “does not take away anything and gives everything.”
Reflecting on Jesus’ question to his first followers—“What are you looking for?”—Leo spoke about passion, vocation and friendship. He said passion can involve both enthusiasm and suffering, and encouraged those in distress to speak honestly to Jesus, seek the company of people who care for them, and remember that suffering does not have the final word.
He urged young people to make time for silence before the Blessed Sacrament, discuss their plans with God and ask what is expected of them. He said some may be called to priesthood or consecrated life, others to marriage and family life, and all are called to put their abilities at the service of others.
Leo also addressed those who feel they have made too many mistakes or that it is too late to start again, telling them to take the next step they can and trust in Christ’s love. He said young people should allow themselves to be cared for, rather than believing they must always appear strong, and concluded by urging them to offer friendship—especially to people going through difficult times—and to show through their lives the value of friendship with Jesus.
The relationship between moral goodness and human flourishing
Moral goodness and human flourishing are deeply connected: living well is not merely possessing health, pleasure, success, or other desirable goods, but becoming the kind of person who chooses and uses those goods rightly. In Catholic thought as represented in the sources here, moral goodness shapes the person’s flourishing, while flourishing reaches its fullest meaning in loving self-gift and communion with God—not simply in getting what one wants.
Human flourishing includes real goods such as life, health, knowledge, friendship, and peace. These are not illusions or obstacles to holiness; they genuinely contribute to a good human life. But possessing them does not, by itself, make a person morally good or fully fulfilled. A person may enjoy many advantages while using them selfishly or unjustly. The relevant distinction is between goods for a person—particular goods that can benefit human life—and the good of the person, the goodness and perfection of the person as a whole.
This helps explain why human flourishing cannot be measured simply by adding up pleasant experiences or material advantages. Particular goods matter, but their meaning depends partly on how they are pursued and what kind of person their pursuit helps form. The source on the distinction cautions that the complete good of the person is not merely the sum of individual goods, even though those goods contribute to it.
Moral goodness concerns more than the outward result of an action. It concerns whether a person’s free choices are ordered toward the genuine good. The source discussing Veritatis splendor summarizes the connection this way:
“Acting is morally good when the choices of freedom are in conformity with man’s true good and thus express the voluntary ordering of the person towards his ultimate end: God himself is the supreme good in whom man finds his full and perfect happiness.”
The point is that a morally good choice does not merely comply with an external rule. It helps order the person toward what is truly good. Repeated choices form dispositions and character; virtues are cultivated capacities to act well. One scholarly account, drawing on Aristotelian and Thomistic thought, describes virtues such as justice and promise-keeping as necessary for the kind of social life human beings lead. Moral conduct is therefore related to flourishing not only because it may produce beneficial outcomes, but because it helps people live well together and become more fully human.
That connection does not mean that every good action brings immediate comfort or success. A person may lose a particular good, or accept sacrifice, for the sake of what is right. The possibility of martyrdom, for example, shows that preserving one’s life is a genuine good but not the whole meaning of human flourishing. The good of the person cannot be reduced to securing every individual advantage.
The Catholic account presented in the sources does not treat a human being as a mind detached from the body, or as a body considered only by biological science. It describes the person as a unity of body and soul, and argues that human freedom and bodily nature belong together. The body is not simply an instrument that a person may use without regard for its meaning; it is part of the person and contributes to the way human flourishing is realized.
Flourishing is also relational. Justice, fidelity, and mercy are not merely private achievements; they shape how people regard and treat one another. A source on mercy argues that responding to people who suffer is part of the good life, not an optional extra that someone may add after achieving personal success. It presents solidarity with the poor and suffering as a path of moral and social transformation.
This is one reason moral goodness can require restraint or generosity. Another person is not simply a means to one’s own satisfaction, and one’s own flourishing cannot be pursued rightly by disregarding the good of others. Particular human goods become part of a fuller life when they are pursued within just and loving relationships.
The sources distinguish between the real value of created goods and the ultimate good of human life. A just act remains worth doing because it is just; moral goodness is not merely a tool for getting some further reward. Yet moral goodness is not the final horizon in itself. The account of Augustine and Thomas Aquinas in the supplied material locates the ultimate end in God, the supreme common good, and presents human fulfillment as exceeding the pursuit of private advantage.
This does not make ordinary human goods unimportant. Rather, it places them in a larger order: they can contribute to flourishing when received and pursued in a way compatible with love of God and neighbor. The source on human action describes this as flourishing through self-gift. On that account, self-gift is not simply an extra sacrifice imposed after one has secured one’s own good; it belongs to the deeper meaning of human goods and relationships.
The connection between moral goodness and flourishing avoids two opposite errors. One is to treat morality as a list of restrictions that stand against happiness. The other is to define happiness as whatever feels satisfying or advantageous at the moment. The sources instead support a view in which moral choices help determine whether our pursuit of real goods contributes to the good of the person and to the good of others.
A practical question, then, is not only, “Will this choice give me something I want?” It is also: “Is the good I seek genuine? Does the way I seek it respect other people and the meaning of my own person? What kind of person will this choice help me become?” On the account presented here, these questions matter because human flourishing is not merely having goods; it is becoming good through rightly ordered action, loving relationships, and, ultimately, orientation toward God.