Pope Leo XIV to visit the Republic of San Marino on August 22
Before travelling to the northern Italian city of Rimini on August 22, Pope Leo XIV will also visit the Republic of San Marino.
4 months ago
Pope Leo XIV’s next pastoral journey will take him to the Republic of San Marino on Saturday, 22 August 2026, marking his second visit to a European micro‑state after a March trip to Monaco 2.
The Holy See’s press office confirmed the San Marino visit on 28 May 2026.
The Pope is scheduled to be in the tiny republic only for the morning of that Saturday, keeping the trip brief 2.
San Marino is one of five European microstates—alongside Monaco, Andorra, Liechtenstein and Vatican City.
By visiting, Pope Leo XIV underscores the Vatican’s pastoral outreach to the smallest sovereign communities in Europe 2.
San Marino, founded in 301 AD, is the world’s oldest continuously existing sovereign state, with a population of just under 34 000.
Only one pontiff has previously visited: Saint John Paul II, who came on 29 August 1982 2.
The visit is limited to the morning of 22 August 2026; no detailed program has been released yet.
The brevity reflects the Pope’s tight itinerary and the logistical constraints of a microstate setting 2.
The trip follows Pope Leo XIV’s March 2026 visit to Monaco, reinforcing a pattern of papal engagement with Europe’s smallest nations.
Together with Andorra, Liechtenstein and Vatican City, these visits highlight the Holy See’s commitment to maintaining close ties with all sovereign entities, regardless of size 2.
Examine papal visits to microstates as expressions of Catholic diplomacy
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Papal visits to European microstates—places like Monaco, Andorra, Liechtenstein, and San Marino—can be read as more than pastoral tourism. Within Catholic understanding, they function as real instruments of diplomacy: the Pope meets civil authorities and peoples in order to promote peace, justice, dialogue, and the common good, while also safeguarding the Church’s pastoral mission and doctrinal independence.
Catholic diplomacy is not chiefly a technique for securing immediate political gains; it is rooted in moral ends. Pope John Paul II describes diplomatic contact as “times of attentive listening” and as an occasion to propose sincere, disinterested cooperation on issues like local peace, international concord, justice and the rights of persons, and the common good.
This frames visits to small states as diplomatically meaningful: even where political weight may seem limited, listening and dialogue remain the central ecclesial action—especially on shared concerns (peace, justice, social cohesion).
John Paul II adds a distinctive criterion: “Efficiency is not the criterion for the value of the message that the Church has.” The Church follows “the sure path of fidelity to God and to men.”
So a papal visit to a microstate—even if it does not produce headline political outcomes—can still be diplomatically “successful” because it expresses fidelity to the Church’s mission of witness, dialogue, and moral engagement.
A second feature is careful boundaries. John Paul II distinguishes diplomacy from political endorsement: stable diplomatic relations “do not necessarily manifest” papal approval of “such and such a regime,” nor approval of all acts of public affairs.
At the same time, he identifies what diplomacy does express: esteem for positive temporal values, a desire for dialogue with those responsible for the common good, and interest in human causes—often through formation of consciences contributing to justice and peace.
This matters for microstates, where the civil landscape is often highly personalized (princely or parliamentary governance) and where Christian identity can be strong; the Church can affirm legitimate values without becoming an instrument of any one political program.
Pope Francis’ 2025 chirograph highlights that the Petrine ministry includes a “fraternal concern for the local Churches,” and that papal representatives are “custodians of that solicitude which moves from the centre to the peripheries.”
He also states that diplomats have a mission that includes representing the Pope to public authorities, exercising an “innate and independent right of legation” connected to the Petrine office—while respecting the norms of international law.
In this framework, microstates are not “peripheries” to be ignored; they are part of the Church’s comprehensive diplomatic-pastoral attentiveness.
In Monaco, Pope Leo XIV directly links the “gift of smallness” to a vocation: putting prosperity “at the service of law and justice.” He contrasts authentic spiritual heritage with “isolation and self-sufficiency,” and calls Monaco to resist the “logic of oppression” that harms peace.
That is diplomatic in substance: it addresses civil society’s public responsibilities and identifies moral risks in an interconnected world—while grounding the call in Scripture’s image that “the little ones” make history.
John Paul II repeatedly presents small states as capable of demonstrating how liberty, faith, and hospitality can be integrated into civil life.
For San Marino, he praises a tradition of “ordered civil development” and “sound moral and religious values,” emphasizing peaceful relationships and collaboration for the common good.
For Liechtenstein, he highlights the “particularly close relationship between the State and the Church” rooted in the Christian history of the country, including state protection of the Catholic Church while still affirming “complete freedom of belief and conscience” and lawful practice of other religions “within ethical bounds and public order.”
Thus, microstates can embody a diplomacy of pluralism under moral order, not pluralism as indifference.
Pope Leo XIV’s 2026 visit to Monaco presents a “city-state marked by the deep bond” to Rome and Catholic faith.
Several aspects stand out as Catholic diplomacy:
This is not “diplomacy by praise alone.” It is a moral diagnosis offered to a civil authority—precisely the kind of “message” the Holy See can deliver without becoming a party to partisan strategies.
John Paul II frames Andorra’s diplomatic relationship as rooted in a “very special bond” between the principality and the Apostolic See, and he links this bond to the principality’s Christian origins and moral values.
He then moves from history to a forward-looking diplomatic claim:
This is a particularly clear example of how a papal encounter with a microstate expresses Catholic diplomacy: it ties civil identity to internationally legible moral norms.
John Paul II’s address to the first ambassador of San Marino to the Holy See celebrates a new phase: upgrading the relationship to the rank of embassy and first accreditation of a nuncio.
He connects diplomacy to moral history:
In addition, in a 1997 address to pilgrims he urges modernization “according to a correct hierarchy of values,” explicitly seeking economic prosperity without “squandering centuries of civilization.”
Diplomatically, this portrays San Marino’s civic development as something the Holy See can speak about in moral terms, supporting the state’s self-understanding while maintaining the Church’s role as messenger of truth and justice rather than partisan actor.
John Paul II’s Liechtenstein remarks combine two poles that are central to Catholic public teaching:
When he welcomes the first ambassador of Liechtenstein to the Holy See, he explicitly links the pastoral visit and prior amicable contact to the formalization of “official” diplomatic relations, presenting this as reinforcing collaboration between Church and State and contributing to “the cause of the entente of peoples.”
Benedict XVI later adds a further diplomatic-theological reinforcement: Liechtenstein’s identity includes “firm roots in the Catholic faith” and “faithfulness to the Chair of Peter,” and he prays for continued peace and well-being.
The diplomatic expression here is not mere religious symbolism; it is a vision of how a state’s identity can be publicly intelligible in moral terms while respecting conscience and pluralism.
Across these cases, papal visits and ambassadorial speeches treat diplomacy as stable, reciprocal relationship “under the sign of politeness, discretion and loyalty.”
Microstates are ideal settings for this style because diplomatic ties often involve a more directly personal interface between civil and ecclesial life; the Church can model a relationship that is cordial without collapsing into political approval.
In Monaco, Andorra, San Marino, and Liechtenstein, the Pope’s message consistently includes public ethics: law and justice, peaceful coexistence, hierarchy of values, freedom under moral order, and economic prosperity constrained by moral commitments.
This matches John Paul II’s view that even when Holy See diplomacy does not exit pastoral role, it can promote justice and peace “above all by the formation of consciences.”
A key interpretive limit is that diplomacy does not mean papal political endorsement. John Paul II explicitly notes that diplomatic relations “do not necessarily manifest” approval of a regime.
So, when papal visits highlight Christian roots, they should be understood as:
Papal visits to microstates express Catholic diplomacy by combining attentive listening, stable relational goodwill, and moral-political guidance aimed at justice and the common good, while carefully avoiding confusion between diplomacy and endorsement of particular regimes. The Holy See thus treats small states not as marginal, but as real partners in a public ethics where faith, liberty, pluralism under moral order, and hospitality can serve as a concrete school for peace.