Your question can be answered by distinguishing (a) what the Church taught as morally permissible/impermissible in principle, and (b) how the Magisterium’s concrete emphasis changed over time as social conditions, penal technology, and international realities evolved. The sources provided show a clear pattern in both areas: the Church’s tradition develops by reading moral principles in light of changing circumstances, while also—especially in the contemporary period—tightening the practical limits on practices that involve taking life.

Introduction: two moral questions, one theological method

Catholic teaching on both the death penalty and war is rooted in the same moral posture: governments and societies must pursue the common good and public order, but the Church insists that this pursuit must never violate the inviolability and dignity of the human person. In the contemporary period, the emphasis becomes more explicit that modern conditions often mean that what was once treated as “necessary” is now no longer necessary in practice, and sometimes is recognized as increasingly inadmissible. 1 2 3

Death penalty: from conditional permissibility to “inadmissible”

From earlier permissibility to “changed circumstances”

The CDF’s 2018 letter explaining the Catechism revision frames the historical evolution as a real development: earlier acceptability was tied to historical conditions. It states that when the political and social situation of the past made the death penalty “an acceptable means for the protection of the common good,” this was not because human dignity could be lost after a crime, but because the ability to protect society without killing was more limited. 1

The same letter continues that today, “the increasing understanding that the dignity of a person is not lost even after committing the most serious crimes,” the deepened meaning of penal sanctions, and especially the development of “more efficacious detention systems that guarantee the due protection of citizens” have led to “a new awareness” that recognizes the “inadmissibility… and… calling for its abolition.” 1

The Evangelium vitae anchor and the “only practicable way” logic

The 2018 CDF letter explicitly links this development to John Paul II’s Evangelium vitae. It quotes the idea that the death penalty can be justified only if it is “the only practicable way to defend the lives of human beings effectively against the aggressor,” and adds the crucial practical qualifier: “cases of absolute necessity… today are very rare, if not practically non-existent.” 4

So the historical evolution is not presented as a sudden moral contradiction, but as a recognition that what might be theoretically justifiable under older circumstances is now, in fact, nearly never necessary due to modern detention capabilities. 4

Pope Francis: the revision reflects the Gospel’s light and dignity of the person

Pope Francis’ statements interpret the Catechism revision as harmonizing with the Church’s prior defense of dignity, while clarifying the moral conclusion in the light of the Gospel.

He says the revision “does not imply any contradiction with past teaching,” because “the Church has always defended the dignity of human life.” 3

Yet he also asserts a strong formulation of inadmissibility: the Church teaches “in the light of the Gospel, that the death penalty is always inadmissible because it offends the inviolability and dignity of the person.” 3

In other words, the Church’s evolution is described as both:

• continuity (dignity is always defended), and
• clarification/intensification of the moral logic (the death penalty offends inviolability/dignity). 3

Continuity arguments and internal debate about “development”

Among the sources you provided, there is also scholarship reflecting how Catholics interpret this evolution. One article emphasizes the CDF’s approach: earlier teaching can be understood as prudentially tied to social circumstances, so the Church’s change is not that the moral core was wrong, but that changed conditions make a previously “acceptable means” no longer appropriate. 5

This is a common way of explaining “development of doctrine”: the principle remains, but the practical judgment about what is necessary/effective shifts as the means available change. 5 2 1

War: historical evolution of just war teaching toward restraint and defense

Classical just war versus modern magisterial emphasis

Your war question can be addressed (using the sources provided) by comparing classical just war with contemporary magisterial framing.

A key thread in the sources is that the contemporary Church often speaks with a strong “presumption against war,” while classical accounts focus more on whether a war is justifiable in a juridical sense. Reichberg notes that contemporary Catholic teaching begins “with a presumption against war and for peaceful settlement of disputes,” referencing The Challenge of Peace (1983). 6

However, Reichberg also argues that the apparent discontinuity may be more about rhetorical framing and vocabulary than about rejecting the possibility of just war outright. He explains that contemporary discourse on peace may eclipse the related discourse on just war, which can create the impression that armed force is necessarily opposed to peace—yet he insists this is not the whole story, because peace is also connected to justice removing obstacles. 7

A key narrowing: just cause increasingly restricted to defense

One major development highlighted in your sources is a restriction of just cause.

Reichberg states that whereas scholastics typically recognized multiple just causes (defense, restitution, punishment), contemporary teaching “restricts just cause solely to the first, namely defense.” 8

He further explains that, on this understanding, “defense” corresponds to resisting armed attack (a “second use of force”), while “offensive” first-use force becomes morally warranted only when it is reactive to prior wrongdoing—though the contemporary account is described as not permitting offensive rationales like punishment or restitution as direct just causes. 8

The idea of war as a condition: modern “war terminology” matters

Another historical factor in the evolution is how the term “war” itself is understood.

Reichberg discusses how classical theorists often saw “war” in an agent-centered way (just acts versus unjust acts), while contemporary discussions more often use “war” in a modern condition/state sense (a mutually recognized state of armed conflict). This semantic shift can make contemporary condemnations of “war” sound like a rejection of just war itself, even when the underlying moral reasoning differs. 9 10 11

Constraints tied to technology and global order

The sources also connect evolution in war teaching to historical changes: the second half of the twentieth century, world wars, and the threat of nuclear confrontation are specifically noted as contexts in which debate intensified and just war discourse was re-examined. 12

Reichberg also notes that technological developments (explicitly including nuclear weapons) led to a more pronounced emphasis on proportionality at the “ad bellum” level (the justice of going to war). 13

Role of international authority (e.g., UN-style enforcement)

Another evolution emphasized in the sources is the increasing priority given to international regulation.

Reichberg describes the view (he attributes to the contemporary magisterial emphasis) that armed force can be regulated by a supra-national authority, and that in many cases beyond strict self-defense, the authority of the international community is “a prerequisite” for military action. 14

This does not mean every war is automatically illegitimate; rather, it signals how the Church increasingly frames moral authorization: lawful force is less about state will and more about justice enacted through recognized authority. 14 2 11

Continuity claim vs discontinuity claim

Finally, the provided sources show an internal scholarly debate: some argue that there is substantial discontinuity; Reichberg argues the discontinuity is “considerably less pronounced” than alleged, because equivocation and vocabulary shifts explain much of the perceived break. 13

At the same time, he grants that some substantive elements are rearranged in response to new conditions—meaning evolution occurs at the level of practical criteria (e.g., defense-only just cause emphasis, nuclear-age proportionality emphasis, and international-law framing). 13 15 14

Putting both evolutions together: a shared “movement”

Although death penalty and war involve different institutions and moral categories, the historical evolution in the provided sources follows a shared pattern:

• Earlier reasoning often treated certain lethal actions as compatible with the common good because effective alternatives were limited (death penalty) or because the moral theory could encompass more just causes (war). 1 2 8
• Contemporary teaching increasingly emphasizes that modern means (especially better detention systems) and modern international structures allow society to protect the common good without taking life—or at least with much tighter moral constraints. 1 2 4 2 14
• In the death penalty case, Pope Francis and the CDF explicitly highlight that the Gospel’s light requires affirming the death penalty’s inadmissibility because it violates inviolability/dignity. 3 16 1

Conclusion

From the provided Catholic sources, the historical evolution can be summarized as follows:

• Death penalty: earlier permissibility is explained as conditional on past social realities; today the development of more effective detention and a stronger moral grasp of human dignity after serious crimes lead to an “inadmissibility” and abolition call, with Pope Francis articulating that, in the light of the Gospel, the death penalty is always inadmissible because it offends the inviolability and dignity of the person. 1 2 3 16 4
• War: the just war tradition is framed increasingly under a presumption against war, with contemporary teaching emphasizing defense as the core just cause and strengthening ties to international authority and modern conditions (including technological and nuclear-age concerns), while scholarship in the sources argues much of the “discontinuity” appearance is due to vocabulary/style differences plus some real rearrangements responding to new circumstances. 6 17 8 2 14 2 13

If you want, you can specify whether you mean (a) a timeline by century (medieval → modern → contemporary), or (b) a thematic evolution focused on “necessity,” “dignity,” and “limits of state power,” and I will tailor the analysis accordingly using only the sources provided.