Traditionalist Sects Convene an «Imperfect General Council» with False Bishops to Elect an Antipope
Traditionalist sects beyond Lefebvrist adopt strict sedevacantist positions. A small online group is attempting to convene an "Imperfect General Council" to elect an antipope. The group seeks to appoint a new Pope, bypassing the Vatican. The movement represents a schismatic trajectory within traditional Catholicism. The article focuses on the growing activity of these sects outside mainstream Catholicism.
3 months ago
Traditionalist groups identifying as sedevacantist have launched an online “Imperfect General Council” that they claim will elect a new pope, a move condemned by the Holy See as schismatic and lacking any canonical legitimacy. 1
The initiative is organized by a network calling itself Unam Sanctam, which argues that a “crisis” at the head of the Church requires an extraordinary gathering of bishops to fill the alleged vacancy of the See of Peter. 1
The promoters claim support from 13 bishops, 53 priests, and 86 religious, though no individual names are disclosed. 1
The Holy See regards the council’s participants as “false bishops” and the entire effort as a schismatic attempt to create an antipope. The article notes that the Vatican has previously excommunicated similar groups, such as the Lefebvrists, for illicit episcopal ordinations and the invalidity of their sacraments. 1
A small but vocal sedevacantist network has convened an “Imperfect General Council” to elect an antipope, invoking a self‑declared emergency and rejecting the legitimacy of Pope Leo XIV. The effort is led by former Lefebvrist priest Pierre Roy and includes other “consecrated” bishops and clergy who lack canonical recognition. The Vatican has labeled the movement schismatic and warned that any ordinations or sacraments performed by its participants are invalid. 1
Investigate conditions for legitimate councils and papal succession in Catholic canon law
Catholic canon law treats ecumenical councils and papal succession as tightly linked to the primacy of the Bishop of Rome: an ecumenical council’s juridical legitimacy depends on papal convocation/presidency and papal confirmation, while the papacy’s continuity depends on valid election, acceptance, and (if needed) episcopal consecration, with special rules when the Apostolic See is vacant or impeded.
Under the 1917 Code, the decisive first condition is juridical:
“An Ecumenical Council cannot be held that was not convoked by the Roman Pontiff.”
This means that a gathering of bishops becomes ecumenical (in the canonical sense) only when the Roman Pontiff convokes it. Without papal convocation, the assembly does not meet the canonical threshold for an ecumenical council.
The same canon describes how the Roman Pontiff governs the council even in how it operates:
So “legitimacy” here is not only about who gathers, but also about who determines the agenda, who presides, and who can conclude/confirm the juridical outcome.
The Catechism ties the concept of ecumenicity to recognition by Peter’s successor:
This underscores that papal confirmation (or at least recognition) functions as the Church’s way of ensuring the council truly belongs to the universal, Petrine communion that defines an ecumenical council.
Once an ecumenical council is legitimately constituted, its authority is described as “supreme” in the relevant domain:
“An Ecumenical Council enjoys supreme power over the universal Church.”
However, this does not mean the council displaces the pope’s prerogatives; canon law simultaneously safeguards the pope’s supreme standing by describing limits on appeals.
The 1917 canon explicitly bars appeal from papal sentences:
“Appeal from a sentence of the Roman Pontiff to an Ecumenical Council is not given.”
This indicates that, in the Church’s juridical order, the pope is not merely a president among equals; he is positioned so that an ecumenical council does not serve as an appellate court “against” papal judgment.
The International Theological Commission explains the council as the fullest expression of episcopal synodality with the pope:
That ecclesiology aligns with the canonical requirements of papal convocation, presidency, agenda-setting, and confirmation.
One source summarizing Catholic canon law states that an ecumenical council is suspended by law itself during vacancy of the Apostolic See, until the Roman Pontiff orders the work continued or dissolved entirely.
This matters when you’re “investigating conditions” for legitimacy, because a council’s ecumenical juridical status is tied to the presence/actuation of the Roman Pontiff’s authority.
Canon law describes the Bishop of the Roman Church (Peter’s successor) as uniquely continuing Peter’s office and possessing supreme governance:
The pope is “head of the college of bishops… and the pastor of the universal Church on earth,” with supreme, full, immediate, and universal ordinary power “always able to exercise freely.”
This provides the theological-juridical basis for why succession rules are so exact: the papacy is the constant principle of unity in governance.
Canon 332 gives the core condition for succession validity in terms of power:
So papal succession is not merely “being chosen”; it becomes effective governance through legitimate election + acceptance, and (where required) immediate episcopal consecration.
Canon 332 also covers a different route of succession-continuity: resignation.
If the Roman Pontiff resigns, it is required for validity that the resignation is made freely and properly manifested, but not that it is accepted by anyone.
This is crucial in “conditions” analysis: legitimacy is not “approval by someone else,” but the internal juridical condition of a free and properly manifested resignation.
Canon 335 addresses what happens when the Apostolic See is vacant or entirely impeded:
“When the Roman See is vacant or entirely impeded, nothing is to be altered in the governance of the universal Church; the special laws issued for these circumstances, however, are to be observed.”
This implies that continuity of governance is preserved by default (nothing changes), while specific procedural norms for that exceptional state must still be followed.
While canon 332 is the heart of succession validity, canon law also provides details of immediate post-election actions. For example, canon 355 describes roles of cardinals in:
This supports the practical side of succession continuity: once the pope-elect needs episcopal ordination, the Church has a defined mechanism, consistent with the requirement that ordination be immediate if episcopal character is lacking.
Your question is about “legitimate councils,” and Catholic law also explains when councils exercise the charism of infallibility. Canon 749 distinguishes:
This reinforces that even the highest doctrinal authority exercised in conciliar form is relationally tied to communion with Peter’s successor.
Putting the cited canons together, the underlying canonical logic is consistent:
The material supplied includes (a) key conciliar legitimacy rules from the 1917 Code, and (b) key papal succession rules from the 1983 Code, but it does not include the corresponding 1983 canon(s) on ecumenical councils’ convocation/presidency/confirmation (e.g., the later numbering that would directly update 1917 can. 222). As a result, the council-conditions analysis here is anchored in the 1917 text and aligned doctrinal/ecclesiological sources, rather than quoting the exact 1983 council-convocation canon.
In Catholic canon law, the legitimacy of an ecumenical council is primarily juridical and Petrine: it must be convoked by the Roman Pontiff, governed with papal presidency/agenda-control, and finally confirmed or at least recognized by Peter’s successor.
Papal succession likewise centers on validity and effectiveness: the elected man gains full supreme power by accepting a legitimate election and (if needed) receiving immediate episcopal consecration, while resignation is valid only if made freely and properly manifested, and governance during vacancy preserves continuity unless special laws apply.