Ukraine remains hopeful for a papal visit, ambassador says
Ukrainian President Zelenskyy and his envoy expressed hope that Pope Leo XIV will visit Ukraine, citing potential historic support amid Russia's attack. Ukraine’s ambassador to the Holy See, Andrii Yurash, said a papal visit is possible, noting numerous invitations to Pope Leo and Archbishop Gallagher from state and church institutions. Archbishop Paul R. Gallagher, the Vatican's secretary for relations with states, met with Zelenskyy during a five‑day visit celebrating the 35th anniversary of the Latin‑rite Church’s restoration in Ukraine. The meeting followed Pope Francis's earlier statement that he would only visit if he could also go to Moscow, underscoring the diplomatic complexity of a papal trip.
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Ukraine’s leadership remains optimistic that Pope Leo XIV will travel to the war‑torn country, while the Holy See says it is carefully assessing the timing, security and diplomatic conditions needed for such a trip. Both sides have exchanged formal invitations, and recent Vatican delegations have highlighted humanitarian aid, prisoner‑of‑war negotiations and the symbolic importance of a papal presence for peace efforts. 1 2
President Volodymyr Zelenskyy and his envoy to the Holy See reiterated hope for a papal visit, describing it as a “truly historic moment” of support. Ambassador Andrii Yurash said that Pope Leo XIV and Vatican Secretary for Relations with States Archbishop Paul R. Gallagher have received multiple invitations from the Ukrainian president and other state and church bodies. 1
Archbishop Gallagher told Vatican Media that the Holy See is studying the “conditions necessary to determine the right time and the most appropriate way” for a papal trip, emphasizing that the invitation is taken “very seriously.” He noted that the question of a visit was the most frequently asked during his six‑day mission. 2
Gallagher’s visit (July 17‑21) coincided with celebrations of the 35th anniversary of the Latin‑rite Church’s renewal in Ukraine, including a large gathering at the Marian shrine of Berdychiv. He also celebrated the first outdoor Mass since the full‑scale war began, at the Shrine of Our Lady of Mount Carmel in Berdychiv, drawing about 3,000 faithful. 1 2
During the mission, a Russian missile barrage struck the Kyiv neighborhood where the apostolic nunciature was located, forcing the Vatican delegation to shelter for the night. Only one casualty was reported. 1
Cardinal Matteo Maria Zuppi, Pope Leo XIV’s special envoy, has been leading a humanitarian mission focused on prisoner exchanges, the return of Ukrainian children taken to Russia, and delivering aid. Zuppi’s meetings with Ukrainian officials underscored the Vatican’s role in seeking a comprehensive peace and establishing humanitarian corridors in the Kherson region. 2
Zelenskyy thanked the Holy See for its support in negotiating the repatriation of deported children and for offering to host high‑level talks aimed at ending hostilities. The Ukrainian ambassador described the Holy See‑Ukraine relationship as “very stable” and a strategic partnership. 1 2
Both sides acknowledge the symbolic and practical importance of a papal visit. While Ukraine remains hopeful and continues to extend invitations, the Vatican is weighing logistical, security and diplomatic factors before committing to a definitive schedule. The next steps will depend on assessments of safety, the potential for a peace‑building impact, and the broader international context. 1 2
Examine Vatican diplomacy in wartime: papal visits and peace advocacy
Vatican diplomacy in wartime is best understood as peace advocacy rooted in moral and divine law, carried out through both diplomatic representations and, at key moments, direct papal presence—especially where suffering civilians require witness, prayer, and a call to reconciliation. The Church’s public stance is not naïve pacifism; it aims at “peace just and solid” through justice, truth, dialogue, and forgiveness.
The Vatican’s approach treats peace as something that must be built on the order established by God and on the recognition of sacred rights of natural and divine law. Peace is therefore not merely a pause in fighting, but a social restoration in which moral law governs relations among peoples. Pius XI describes peace as dependent on peoples “faithfully and spontaneously” recognizing divine and natural order, and he explicitly argues that treaties, conferences, or statecraft are insufficient if moral law is excluded.
This framework supports a crucial distinction used implicitly across the Church’s wartime diplomacy: the Holy See can advocate peace publicly, but it cannot treat peace as value-neutral bargaining. Peace must be rightly ordered—which requires truth, justice, and conscience. Pius XI states that stable peace requires that “in the first place” the “sacred rights of natural and divine law” are recognized, since otherwise even economic or political solutions will not stabilize society.
Pius XI also grounds Christian peace in Christ Himself—“our peace”—and connects prayer with resisting nationalistic domination. He writes that people who pray to the “God of peace and of love” will not “kindle flames of discord,” nor foster “inordinate love of country” that makes the nation into “its own god.”
Wartime diplomacy, in the Church’s self-understanding, is not merely a negotiating technique; it is also moral mediation. Pope Pius XII, speaking to the diplomatic corps in 1946, characterizes the Holy See’s wartime role as an “absolute impartiality” and a “zelo” (zeal) for peace—described as a spiritual and moral oasis amid violence.
Several elements are especially important:
Pius XII emphasizes that the Holy See aimed “not to say a single unjust word,” and “to reprove all iniquity,” while avoiding phrasing that would do more harm than good—particularly toward innocent populations under oppression.
He also describes restraint as principled rather than cowardly: he claims there was a “constant preoccupation” to stop a conflict “so disastrous” for humanity, and he notes that—despite pressures—he avoided giving even an “indication” of approval or encouragement for the war pursued against Russia in 1941.
This yields a coherent diplomatic ethic: moral condemnation is paired with careful communication, because the goal is peace and protection of innocents—not propaganda.
In the same 1946 discourse, Pius XII articulates the goal as “peace, just and solid,” able to guarantee at least a tolerable life for all. He adds: such peace will not be a “work of a day” but will cost time and suffering—so diplomacy is long-haul work aimed at durable order.
The Holy See also clarifies that its “service to the cause of peace” is not pacifism understood as ignoring rights and duties relevant to conflict. In an address preserved in the Acta Apostolicae Sedis (1966), the Church frames its peace service as involving virtues that generate peace—patience, forgiveness, humanity, and magnanimity—and insists the cause of peace has moral value even when political outcomes are uncertain.
This matters for interpreting Vatican wartime diplomacy: the Church’s peace advocacy is ethical and juridical (concerned with rights, justice, truth), not merely emotional opposition to war.
When wars devastate a region, papal diplomacy often takes a second form: direct papal visits. These are not primarily about strategy or leverage; they function as witness, solidarity with victims, and a demand for reconciliation that must reach hearts and communities.
John Paul II’s visit to Sarajevo (April 1997) offers a clear template. He describes the entire pastoral visit as marked by “incessant prayer for peace,” from Saturday evening to Sunday afternoon, and he explains that each stage intended to emphasize “hope.”
Crucially, he interprets the war’s aftermath as producing “revenge and hatred,” and he says hope takes concrete form in forgiveness and reconciliation.
In his message, reconciliation is not optional sentiment; it is presented as the only way to lasting peace: “Reconciliation and dialogue is the only way to lasting peace.”
John Paul II also explicitly ties peace advocacy to respect for persons “without distinction of race or religion,” and with “special regard for the poor and the victims of hardship.”
In other words, papal presence aims to counter the logic of ethnic hatred that war can inflame. His peace message includes safeguarding identity within a pluralistic civic order: diversity is a “source of enrichment” when directed “in the service of peace” and when political reconstruction protects each group’s identity.
John Paul II’s address to political leaders in Bosnia-Herzegovina explains that although peace requires institutional work and sincere dialogue respecting justice, it also depends “no less decisively” on a renewed solidarity of minds and hearts. He identifies forgiveness as the necessary foundation: “for the edifice of peace to be solid… it will have to be built on the courage of forgiveness.”
This provides a direct link between piety and policy in Vatican wartime practice: the Holy See does not treat spirituality as irrelevant to politics; it treats forgiveness and reconciliation as the interior conditions that make durable peace possible.
Wartime diplomacy must engage with negotiations, security discussions, and disarmament. The Church’s materials here emphasize two themes: (1) peace is always possible and war is not inevitable; (2) achieving peace requires an ethical and spiritual humanism that changes how nations approach security.
In a 2008 letter connected with a seminar on “Disarmament, Development and Peace,” Pope Benedict XVI states that “war is never inevitable and peace is always possible,” and calls for change in the course of history through “trust,” “dialogue,” and “solidarity.”
Benedict also insists that disarmament has an “ethical and spiritual nature,” meaning it is not just technical arms reduction but a moral project oriented toward authentic and lasting peace.
Benedict XVI’s 2007 address to the diplomatic corps situates diplomacy as serving peace and development, mentioning hope and commitment “to serve the cause of peace and the development of individuals and peoples.” He connects peace to urgent humanitarian and moral concerns—hunger, justice, humanitarian protection, and even migration—suggesting that the moral credibility of diplomacy depends on addressing human suffering, not only security.
Pope Francis’s wartime peace advocacy repeatedly returns to the same core claim: war is a defeat and must be countered by prayer, penance, and conversion of hearts.
In a 2025 general audience, Francis calls people to pray for peace and to “do our utmost for peace,” emphasizing starkly: “war is a defeat. Always.”
In that same teaching cadence, Francis links peace to conversion and dialogue: he asks the Lord to “convert the hearts of those who still insist on war,” so that the desire for peace can prevail and open “the way to a cease-fire and dialogue.”
Similarly, in 2022, he describes war as “madness” and makes the victims central—“the innocent pay [the price of] war”—while urging that concrete steps be taken to end it.
These Francis themes resonate strongly with the older Vatican pattern: the Holy See treats peace advocacy not as a diplomatic “option,” but as part of Christian moral life that must reach conscience and action.
Finally, Pope Leo XIV’s recent message to diplomats highlights dialogue as an ethical discipline—language must be educated “in the school of listening and dialogue”—and he treats offense and propaganda as a kind of warfare of words. He frames peace as guided by truth and honesty, and he recalls Paul VI’s insistence on “never again war.”
Across these sources, Vatican diplomacy in wartime can be described in four interlocking actions:
In sum, the Vatican’s wartime peace advocacy is neither purely diplomatic nor merely devotional: it is moral diplomacy, in which prayer, justice, and reconciliation are treated as mutually necessary conditions for peace that can endure.