Quoldlibet I: The question that has been asked is about God, both with regard to divine nature and the human nature assumed. - Question 2: There were two points of inquiry concerning the human nature in Christ:

I q. 21. Whether there is one sonship in Christ by which he is related to the Father and is mother, or two? 2. Whether Christ was dead on the cross?

Quoldlibet I: The question that has been asked is about God, both with regard to divine nature and the human nature assumed. - Question 6: Then three questions were asked about confession: - Article 1: Whether it is sufficient for someone to confess by writing, or is it necessary for him to confess by spoken word?

I q. 6 a. 1 s.c.But to the contrary: in Romans 10:10 it is said, “Confession is made orally for salvation.”

Quoldlibet I: The question that has been asked is about God, both with regard to divine nature and the human nature assumed. - Question 9: Then four questions pertaining to sin were asked: - Article 2: Whether perjury is a more serious sin than homicide?

I q. 9 a. 2 arg. 2Moreover, it is more serious to sin against God than against man. But perjury is a sin against God, homicide a sin against man. Therefore perjury is a more serious sin than homicide.

Quoldlibet I: The question that has been asked is about God, both with regard to divine nature and the human nature assumed. - Question 10: Then with regard to the good in the order of glory two questions were asked about glorified bodies:

I q. 101. whether a glorified body can exist naturally in the same place with another non-glorified body? 2. whether this can be accomplished miraculously?

Quoldlibet II: Questions were asked concerning Christ, angels, and men. - Question 2: Then questions were asked about angels: first as to their composition, second as to the time of their motion. - Article 1: Whether an angel is composed of essence and being (esse) in the manner of a substance?

II q. 2 a. 1 s.c.But to the contrary: the commentary on De causis says that "An intelligence, which we call an angel, has essence and being." II q. 2 a. 1 ad. 1But it must be known that something is participated in in two ways. In one way it is participated in as though belonging to the substance of the thing participating, as a genus is participated in by a species of it. However, a creature does not participate in being this way for that belongs to the substance of a thing which enters into its definition, but being (ens) is not included in the definition of a creature because it is neither a genus nor a difference. So it is participated in as something not belonging to the thing's essence. And therefore, the question 'Is it?' is different from the question 'What is it?' So, since all that is outside a thing's essence may be called an accident; the being which pertains to the question 'Is it?' is an accident. Therefore, the Commentator says on Metaphysica that this proposition, 'Socrates is,' is an accidental predication when it signifies either a thing's being (entitatem) or the truth of a proposition." But it is true that this noun 'being' (ens), when it signifies a thing to which such being (esse) is attributable, signifies the thing's essence and according to this signification being is divided into the ten categories. But it does not signify univocally because it is not attributable to all things by the same intelligible notion but is attributable to substance through itself (per se) and to the other categories in another fashion." Therefore, if there is composition in an angel of essence and being, this is not a composition as from the parts of a substance but as from a substance and what adheres to the substance. Therefore, to the first it must be said that sometimes a third thing results from those which are joined together; as the humanity by which a man is a man is constituted from soul and body so a man is composed of soul and body. Sometimes, however, a third thing does not result from those which are joined together but a kind of composite intelligible notion results, as when the notions 'man' and 'white' go to make up the intelligible notion 'white man' And in such things something is composed of itself and another, just as a white thing is composed of that which is white and whiteness.

Quoldlibet II: Questions were asked concerning Christ, angels, and men. - Question 1: Concerning Christ, two questions were asked about his passion:

II q. 11. whether he was numerically the same man during the three days of death? 2. whether any suffering of Christ would have sufficed for the redemption of mankind without death?

Quoldlibet II: Questions were asked concerning Christ, angels, and men. - Question 2: Then questions were asked about angels: first as to their composition, second as to the time of their motion.

II q. 21. whether an angel is a composite of essence and being (esse) in the manner of a substance? 2. whether supposit and nature are diverse in an angel?

Quoldlibet II: Questions were asked concerning Christ, angels, and men. - Question 3: Then it was asked about the time through which God moves a spiritual creature, according to Augustine.

II q. 3 ad. 1Therefore, to the first it must be said that Augustine makes the difference of times understood from the very difference of the motions.

Quoldlibet II: Questions were asked concerning Christ, angels, and men. - Question 7: Two questions were asked concerning punishments themselves:

II q. 71. whether a separated soul can be acted upon by corporeal fire? 2. whether one of two individuals worthy of the same punishment lingers longer in Purgatory than the other?

Quodlibetal Questions, IX - Question 2 - Article 2[3]: "Whether there is only one being in Christ?"

IX q. 2 a. 2[3] ad. 3Reply 3: A temporal generation is not terminated in the being of an eternal suppositum so that it begins to be through it simply, but it begins to be a suppositum possessing that property, [i.e.] to be the suppositum of a human nature. IX q. 2 a. 2[3] ad. 4Reply 4: That objection proceeds from being which consists in an act of the mind, insofar as those things are only said with respect to mental being, since it is also possible to ask "does it exist?" of blindness.

Quoldlibet I: The question that has been asked is about God, both with regard to divine nature and the human nature assumed. - Question 1: The divine nature - Article: Whether the blessed Benedict saw the divine essence in the vision in which he saw the whole world?

I q. 1 a arg. 1And it was shown that he did. For Gregory says in Dialogorum 2 where he speaks of this vision, that "All creation becomes insignificant for a soul that sees the Creator."But to see God is to see the divine essence. Therefore, the I blessed Benedict saw the divine essence. I q. 1 a arg. 2Further. Gregory adds in the same place that "He saw the whole world in the divine light." But there is no other light or radiance of God than God himself, as Gregory says and as the Glossa on Exodus 33:20, "No man will see me and live," says. Therefore, the blessed Benedict saw God through the divine essence. I q. 1 a s.c.But to the contrary: John 1:18 says, "No man has seen God at any time." The Glossa says on this that "No one living in mortal flesh can see God's essence. I q. 1 a co.I answer: it must be said that, according to Wisdom 9:15, “A perishable body weighs the soul down.” However, the highest elevation of the human mind is the attainment of a vision of the divine essence. So it is impossible for a human mind united to a body to see God’s essence unless, Super Genesim ad literam, a man is entirely dead to this mortal life or is so separated from his senses that he does not know whether he is in or outside his body, as we read concerning Paul in 2 Cor 12:3. However, when he had that vision the blessed Benedict was neither entirely dead to this life nor separated from his bodily senses, which is clear from the fact that while remaining in the same vision he summoned another person to see the same thing, as Gregory relates. So it is clear that he did not see God’s essence. I q. 1 a ad. 1Therefore, to the first it must be said that Gregory means in those words to argue from a kind of proportion. For if the ones who see God’s essence reckon all creation insignificant in comparison, it is not astonishing if the blessed Benedict could see something more through the divine light than men commonly see. I q. 1 a ad. 2To the second it must be said that sometimes God himself is called the light of God, sometimes another light derived from God is called this, according to Psalm 36 (35):9: “In your light we shall see the light.” Here, however, it means the light derived from God.

Quoldlibet I: The question that has been asked is about God, both with regard to divine nature and the human nature assumed. - Question 2: There were two points of inquiry concerning the human nature in Christ: - Article 1: Whether there is one sonship in Christ by which he is related to he Father and his mother, or two?

I q. 2 a. 1 arg. 1Concerning the first we proceeded as follows: It seems that there are two sonships in Christ. For when the causes of relations are multiplied, the relations are multiplied. However, generation is the cause of sonship. Therefore since the generation by which Christ was born eternally from the Father and that by which he was born temporally from his mother are diverse, the sonship by which he is related to the Father and that by which he is related to his mother will also be diverse. I q. 2 a. 1 arg. 2Moreover, what receives a relative property in time without changing can even more receive a relative property in time without changing. But the Son of God receives an absolute property in time without changing because on Luke 1:32, “He shall be great and shall be called Son of the Highest,” Ambrose says, “He will not therefore be great because he was not great before being born of the Virgin, but because the power which the Son of God has by nature the man was going to receive in time. Therefore, even more could the Son of God receive a new sonship in time without changing. So two sonships are appropriate to him, one eternal and the other temporal. I q. 2 a. 1 s.c.But to the contrary: the unity of the cause which makes something such a thing makes it one such thing. But by sonship someone is a son, therefore by one sonship he is one son. Since Christ is one son and not two, there are not two sonships in him but one only. I q. 2 a. 1 co.I answer: it must be said that relations differ from all other categories of things in that those things which belong to other categories are real things from the very natures of their categories, as are quantities from the nature of quantity, and qualities from the nature of quality. But relations are not real things from the nature of relation. For we find certain relations which are not real but mental only, for example a knowable object is related not by any real relation existing in the knowable object but rather because knowledge is related to the object, according to the Philosopher in Metaphysica 5. But the reality of a relation comes from its cause when one thing has a natural order to another. The natural and real order is for them the relation itself. So right and left in an animal are real relations because they follow certain natural powers; however, in a column they are mental relations only according to an animal’s position in relation to the column. But a thing has being and unity from the same cause; and therefore, because of the unity of the cause it happens that there is only one real relation. This is obvious in the case of equality, for there is in one body only one relation of equality because of the one quantity, although this may be in regard to a number of things insofar as it is said to be equal to different bodies. If relations were really multiplied in one body according to all those references to which it is equal, it would follow that there would be an infinite or indeterminate number of accidents in one thing. A teacher is by one relation a teacher of all whom he teaches he same thing, although there may be many of these; so also according to one real sonship one man is the son of his father and of his mother because by one birth he received one nature from both of them. Therefore, following this reasoning, it seems that we must say that the real sonships in Christ by which he is related to the Father and to his mother are different because he is born from both by different acts of generation and the nature which he has from the Father and the nature which he has from his mother are diverse. But another reason weakens that. For it must be universally held that no relation of God t creature really exists in God, but such is only a mental relation because God is above every order of creature and is the measure of every creature from which every creature derives, and not conversely. This is even truer of a knowable object in relation to knowledge, for in the knowable object there is no real relation to knowledge for these reasons. We must, however, consider that the subject of sonship is not a nature or some part of a nature, for we do not say that humanity is a daughter nor that it is a head or an eye. Now in Christ we assign only one supposit and one hypostasis, just as we also assign one person which is an eternal supposit in which there can be no real relation to a creature as was just said. So the only remaining alternative is that the sonship by which Christ is related to his mother is a mental relation only. But because of this it does not follow that he is not really the son of the Virgin, for just as God is really Lord because of the real power by which he contains a creature, so Christ really is the son of the Virgin because of the real nature which he received from his mother. If, however, there were many supposits in Christ it would be necessary to assign two sonships to Christ. But his I hold to be erroneous and is found condemned in the Councils. So I say that in Christ there is only one real relation by which he is related to the Father. I q. 2 a. 1 ad. 1To the first it must therefore be stated that we do not deny there is a real sonship in Christ by which he is related to his mother because the relation’s cause is lacking, but because the subject of such a relation is lacking, since here is no created supposit or hypostasis in Christ. I q. 2 a. 1 ad. 2To the second it must be stated that the same way in which that man received the power of God temporarily, he receive the eternal sonship in as much as it was accomplished in such a way that there would be one divine and human person, as Ambrose supposes in the same place. This, however, was not accomplished through something really absolute or relative temporally inhering in the Son of God, but solely through the union which really exists in the created nature but is not, however, really in the person assuming it. What is objected on the contrary side has no necessity, for a thing is sometimes said to be one such thing because of the subject’s substantial unity although there are many qualities in it, as there are color and taste in an apple.

Quoldlibet I: The question that has been asked is about God, both with regard to divine nature and the human nature assumed. - Question 2: There were two points of inquiry concerning the human nature in Christ: - Article 2: Whether Christ was dead on the cross?

I q. 2 a. 2 arg. 1Concerning the second we proceed as follows: it seems that Christ was not dead on the cross. For if he was dead, this was either because he himself separated his soul from his body, or because of his wounds. But he did not die in the first way for then it would follow that the Jews would not have killed Christ but he would have killed himself, which is inappropriate. And likewise he did not die in the second way because a death due to wounds occurs when a man reaches the greatest weakness, which was not the case with Christ because he died crying out loudly. Therefore, Christ was in no way dead on the cross. I q. 2 a. 2 arg. 2Moreover, human nature was no weaker in Christ than in other men, but no other man would die so quickly because of wounds of the hands and feet. The wound in the side, however, was inflicted on Christ after his death. Therefore, he was not dead on the cross since there seems to be no cause for his death. I q. 2 a. 2 s.c.But to the contrary: John 19:30 says that Christ hanging on the cross “with his head bowed, gave up the ghost.” Death, however, is due to the soul’s separation from the body, therefore Christ was dead on the cross. I q. 2 a. 2 co.I answer: it must be said that we must confess without any doubt that Christ was truly dead on the cross. In order to see the cause of his death we must consider that since Christ was true God and man, whatever pertains to Christ’s human nature was subject to his power, which does not happen in others who are purely men, for physical things are not subject to their wills. This is the cause of Christ’s suffering and rejoicing simultaneously: by his willing, death was effected so that there would be no overflowing from the higher powers to the lower ones, nor would the higher powers be impeded in their own acts because of the suffering of the lower ones. This cannot happen in other men because of the natural conjunction of the powers with one another. I q. 2 a. 2 ad. 1And we must answer in like manner to that which was argued, for a violent death occurs because a nature yields to harm inflicted, and so long as the nature can resist so long is death delayed. Hence things in which a nature is stronger die more slowly from the same cause. However, how much the nature would resist harm inflicted and when it would yield were subject to Christ’s will. Hence by his willing the nature resisted to the end the harm inflicted more than it could in other men so that in the end, after much effusion of blood and as though with his faculties still intact, he cried out with a loud voice, and at once by his willing the nature yielded and he gave up the ghost so that he might show himself Lord of nature and of life and death. And marveling at this, the centurion said in Mark 15:39: “Truly this man was the Son of God.” I q. 2 a. 2 ad. 2Therefore, it is true both that the Jews killed Christ by inflicting mortal harm, and that he himself laid down his soul and gave up the ghost because when he willed it his nature yielded totally to the harm inflicted. Nor is he to be blamed as though he killed himself. For the body exists for the sake of the soul and not conversely. So injury is done to the soul when it is expelled from the body against the soul’s natural desire because of an injury inflicted on the body, although perhaps not because of the depraved will of a suicide. But if the soul had in its power the capacity to withdraw from and come into the body again when it willed, there would be no greater blame if it abandoned the body than if an inhabitant deserted a home. However, it is a matter of blame for it to be expelled from thence unwillingly. The response to the objections is clear.

Quoldlibet I: The question that has been asked is about God, both with regard to divine nature and the human nature assumed. - Question 3: Two questions were asked concerning angels.

I q. 31. First: Whether an angel depends on a corporeal place according to its essence or is it in a corporeal place according to its action only? 2. Secondly: Concerning an angel’s motion, whether it can move from one place to another without going through an intermediate place.

Quoldlibet I: The question that has been asked is about God, both with regard to divine nature and the human nature assumed. - Question 3: Two questions were asked concerning angels. - Article 1: Whether an angel depends on a corporeal place according to its essence or is it in a corporeal place according to its action only?

I q. 3 a. 1 arg. 1On the first we proceed as follows: It seems that an angel is not in a place according to its action only. For since existence is prior to action, existence in a place is prior to action in a place. But something later is not the cause of something prior. Therefore acting in a place is not the cause of an angel’s existing in a place. I q. 3 a. 1 arg. 2Moreover, two angels can act in one place. Therefore, if an angel were in a place only through action, it would follow that many angels would exist simultaneously in one place, which is reputed to be impossible. I q. 3 a. 1 s.c.On the contrary, the more noble does not depend on the less noble. But the essence of an angel is more noble than bodily place. Therefore it does not depend on a bodily place. I q. 3 a. 1 co.I answer: The manner in which an angel is in a bodily place can be considered from the manner in which a body is in a place. A body is in place by contact with the place. Bodily contact is through dimensive qantity, which an angel does not have, since it is incorporeal. But in place of that there is virtual quanity. So just as a body is in a place by contact of its dimensive quantity, so an angel is in a place by the contact of its power (virtus). But is anyone wishes to call virtual contact "operation", because to operate is the proper effect of power, an angel could be said to be in place by way of operation Yet operation should not be taken to mean only motion, but any form of union by which its power unites with a body: by presiding, containing, or any other way. I q. 3 a. 1 ad. 1To the first objection, we say that nothing prevents somethng to be prior simply, which is not prior in a particular respect. Thus a body as a subject is simply prior to a surface, but not in so far as it is colored. Similarly, a body is simply prior to touch, yet it is in place by the contact of its dimensive quantity. Likewise, an angel is in place by the contact of its power. I q. 3 a. 1 ad. 2To the second objection, we say that if something is moved perfectly by one mover, it is not appropriate for it to be moved immediately and at the same time by another. So the objection favors the opposite conclusion to the one proposed.

Quoldlibet I: The question that has been asked is about God, both with regard to divine nature and the human nature assumed. - Question 3: Two questions were asked concerning angels. - Article 2: Whether an angel can move from one place to another without passing through an intermediate place?

I q. 3 a. 2 arg. 1On the second we proceed as follows: it seems that an angel cannot move from place to place without passing through an intermediate place. For everything that moves is in the process of changing before being in the state of completion of change, as Physica 6 proves. But if an angel moves from one place to another, for example from A to Be, when it is at B it is in the state of completion of change. Hence it was in the process of changing before. But not when it was at A because then it was not yet moving. Therefore, it will be in the process of changing when it is at C which is the intermediate between A and B. So it is necessary for it to pass through an intermediate. I q. 3 a. 2 arg. 2Moreover, if an angel moves from A to B without passing through an intermediate, it will be necessary for it to be destroyed at A and created again at B. This is impossible because then it would not be the same angel. Therefore, it is necessary for it to pass through an intermediate. I q. 3 a. 2 s.c.But to the contrary: everything that passes through an intermediate must first pass through something equal to the thing or less before something greater, as is said in Physica 6 and as it appears to the senses. But it cannot be less space than the angel which is indivisible, so it is necessary for it to pass through something equal to the angel which is an indivisible place like a point. An infinite number of points, however, lie between any two terms of motion. Therefore, if it were necessary for an angel in its motion to pass through an intermediate place, it would be necessary for it to pass through an infinite number, which is impossible. I q. 3 a. 2 co.I answer: it must be stated that an angel can if it wants move from one place to another without passing through an intermediate place, and if it wants it can pass through an intermediate place. The reason for this is that a body is in a place as contained by it, and therefore it is necessary that in moving it follow the condition of the place so that it passes through intermediate places prior to arriving at the boundaries of the place. But since an angel is in a place through contact by power, it is not subject to the place so as to be contained by it, but rather contains the place, being supereminent in the place by its power; so it is not necessary for it to follow the conditions of place in its motion. But it is subject to its will that it be attached to this place and hat through contact by power, and without an intermediate place if it wants, just as an intellect can be attached to one extreme in understanding, e.g., to white, and afterwards to black, indifferently, either thinking or not thinking of the colors in between (although a body subject to color cannot move from white to black except through an intermediate color). I q. 3 a. 2 ad. 1To the first it must therefore be stated that the Philosopher’s words and his proof concern continuous motion. However, an angel’s motion is not necessarily continuous, but we call the very succession of the aforesaid applications its motion, just as we call the succession of thoughts or states of mind the motion of a spiritual creature according to Augustine in Super Genesim ad litteram. I q. 3 a. 2 ad. 2To the second it must be said that this does not happen through the destruction or new creation of an angel, but because its power is supereminent over a place. As to what is objected on the contrary side, it must be said that an angel is not in a place through having a common measure with the place but through the application of its power to the place, which application can indifferently be to a divisible and to an indivisible place. So it can move continuously as something which exists in a divisible place by continually intercepting space. But according as it is in an indivisible place its motion cannot be continuous nor pass through all intermediates.

Quoldlibet I: The question that has been asked is about God, both with regard to divine nature and the human nature assumed. - Question 4: Then it was asked concerning man: first as to the good in the order of nature, second as to the good in the order of grace, third as to the good in the order of glory. - Article 3: Whether man in the state of innocence loved God above all things?

I q. 4 a. 3 arg. 3Moreover, nature curves back upon itself, since it channels back to itself all things that it loves. But the adequate cause of each thing is of like kind only more so. Therefore, by natural love he loved himself more than God, so he did not love God above all things. I q. 4 a. 3 s.c.But to the contrary: if he did not love God more than himself, either he loved him less than himself or equally with himself. In each way it follows that man took pleasure in himself while he did not refer himself to God. However, taking pleasure in oneself brings the perversity of sin, as Augustine says. Therefore, the first man in the state of innocence was already perverted through sin, which is impossible. So it follows that he loved God above all things. I q. 4 a. 3 ad. 1To the first it must therefore be said that to love God as the principle of all being pertains to natural love, but to love God as the object of beatitude pertains to he gratuitous love in which merit consists. However, it is not necessary that we sustain in this matter the opinion of the Master who said that man in the first state did not have the grace through which he could merit.

Quoldlibet I: The question that has been asked is about God, both with regard to divine nature and the human nature assumed. - Question 6: Then three questions were asked about confession: - Article 3: Whether a parish priest ought to believe his subject when he says he confessed to another and give him the Eucharist?

I q. 6 a. 3 ad. 2To the second it must be said that a spiritual pastor ought diligently to recognize the appearance of his flock by considering its exterior life. But he cannot investigate more diligently than by way of confession, hence it is necessary for him to believe those things which are said to him by his subject.

Quoldlibet I: The question that has been asked is about God, both with regard to divine nature and the human nature assumed. - Question 9: Then four questions pertaining to sin were asked: - Article 4: Whether a monk sins mortally in eating meat?

I q. 9 a. 4 arg. 1Concerning the fourth we proceed as follows: it seems that a monk sins mortally in eating meat. For the canon law De consecratione, d. 5, in the chapter "Corneal," says that monks ought not to eat meat and if they do the contrary they ought to be incarcerated. But such punishment is only inflicted for a mortal sin, therefore monks sin mortally in eating meat.

Quoldlibet II: Questions were asked concerning Christ, angels, and men. - Question 1: Concerning Christ, two questions were asked about his passion: - Article 1: Whether Christ was the same man during the three days of death?

II q. 1 a. 1 arg. 1On the first we proceed as follows: it seems that Christ was the same man during the three days. For Matthew 12:40 says, "As Jonah was in the belly of the whale for three days and three nights, so will the son of man be in the heart of the earth." But the son of man in the heart of the earth was not other than the son of man who spoke on earth, otherwise Christ would have been two sons. Therefore, he was the same man during the three days of death.